Raising the Cheboksary Reservoir Level

Raising the Cheboksary Reservoir Level — a Soviet project, recognized as ineffective in 1989, to fill the Cheboksary reservoir to an elevation of 68 m above sea level. Privatization has made it possible to economically separate costs from revenues, allowing the hydroelectric station's turbines to be brought to their rated capacity at the state's expense while a private company collects the profit.

In the process, more than 83,000 hectares of land in Mari El will be flooded. That republic will lose its finest forest lands.

Filling the reservoir to its design elevation is linked to a rise of more than 4 meters in the levels of the Volga and Oka rivers in Nizhny Novgorod.

Meanwhile, electricity generation in the Volga basin — barring yet another energy catastrophe — will increase by 0.25%.

Annual consumption of electricity in Nizhny Novgorod Region will be covered to the extent of 5.5%.

The Nature of the Issue

When the Cheboksary Reservoir is filled to the 68 m mark, nearly twice as much land will be flooded compared to the 63 m mark — 89,900 hectares in total, including:

• agricultural land — 29,100 ha;

• forests — 55,900 ha;

• arable land — 2,100 ha.

The flooding will affect 11 agricultural districts, Nizhny Novgorod, Dzerzhinsk, Bor, Lyskovo, and Kozmodemyansk.

The territories of the Fokino, Kurmysh, and other lowlands (floodplains) were not included in the total area of flooded land. As experience has shown, the planned dams and pumping systems will not protect the meadows at the 68 m mark — meaning the floodplains will progressively become waterlogged and inundated. The total area of flooded territories (including the built-up areas of populated localities) will amount to 350,000 hectares. Vast, densely populated and economically active areas will be inundated — first and foremost the megacity of Nizhny Novgorod and the adjacent industrial centers, as well as the lands of Vorotynsky and Lyskovsky Districts. At the 68 m mark, the best and most productive habitats for game fauna will be destroyed. Annual timber losses will reach 30,000 cubic meters, and forest products — berries, mushrooms, medicinal plants — 25 tonnes.

Nizhny Novgorod Region will lose approximately 23,000 hectares of agricultural land — arable fields, hayfields, and pastures. In Borsky District alone, these losses will amount to roughly 2,500 ha. The celebrated Bor meadows will be inundated. It should also be noted that filling the Cheboksary Reservoir to its design level will significantly worsen the flooding of the low-lying parts of Nizhny Novgorod. Groundwater levels will rise, with particularly adverse effects on the left-bank floodplain.

Rising river levels and their fluctuation resulting from reservoir drawdowns will lead to bank erosion and the flooding and waterlogging of extensive areas in the Zarechka part of Nizhny Novgorod. Building basements, district heating ducts, and sewage networks will be inundated and damaged. In October 2011, Rasin Khaziyakhmetov, Director of Technical Policy at RusHydro, announced a postponement of the water-level raising schedule: whereas the spring flood of 2015–2016 had originally been cited, the new target became the spring flood of 2020–2021 — a five-year delay. The postponement came directly after the regional pre-election campaign of the Nizhny Novgorod ^[1][2] United Russia members, during which the issue of protecting Nizhny Novgorod residents from flooding was actively used in public rhetoric. According to estimates circulating in the autumn of 2011, if the project were carried out, 59 populated localities in Nizhny Novgorod Region would be submerged; from 23 September 2011 onward, the region was collecting signatures for a petition to the Prime Minister against raising the water level.^[2]

News

A news feed on the fight to preserve the Volga can be found on the website vgoroden.ru.

On 28 March, the working group of the Legislative Assembly on the completion of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station heard reports from the expert organizations that, commissioned by the federal government and by RusHydro — the company that will be developing the Cheboksary hydroelectric station — are conducting survey work. It emerged that as early as May of the current year they will submit all project data on the dam's construction and the possible consequences of that construction for the regions, including Nizhny Novgorod Region, to the President. The President, within the following month — that is, presumably in the summer of the current year — will make a decision on commencing the completion of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station.

Representatives of RusHydro and expert organizations presented their findings — preliminary but already close to final. Even according to their optimistic projections, on the basis of which the president is expected to authorize construction, a 5-meter rise in water level in Nizhny Novgorod Region alone would result in:

• 8 settlements being flooded;
• 21 settlements being partially inundated;
• more than 2,000 structures and facilities being flooded or partially inundated.

The ecologists and hydraulic engineering specialists present agreed that these figures are understated.

Representatives from various districts took the floor. In Kstovsky District, for instance, raising the Cheboksary reservoir level would clearly lead — and even the commissioned experts do not deny this — to the flooding of both an oil pipeline and a water-pumping station; landslides would threaten villages on the right bank of the Volga (Zimyonki, Veliky Vrag, Barmino). In Vorotynsky District, something close to a Venice could take shape. And this is on the high bank.

What, then, would happen to the left, low-lying bank? The contractors answer that the shoreline would shift by 30 metres — meaning 30 metres would be flooded, while waterlogging (i.e. swamping) would extend 2.5 kilometres back from the existing water's edge. Specialists counter that, given the existing network of lakes and marshes, inundation would penetrate 10 to 15 kilometres deep across the entire left bank.

All experts agree that the gravest danger lies not even in outright flooding but in waterlogging and bank erosion — that is, landslides, whose scale will increase along the right bank of the Volga. One must not overlook such problems as the flooding of livestock burial grounds and the flooding of the area around Dzerzhinsk, where vast quantities of chemical waste are buried. All of these toxic substances will be leached from the ground and will enter the Oka, and from there the Volga. The contamination would reach as far as Kazan, and then Astrakhan itself. This would be a catastrophe on a national scale.

Add to this the problem of drinking water, especially in rural areas.

A meeting on what all this would mean for Nizhny Novgorod itself was scheduled for today, 4 April, but has been postponed indefinitely. And in May, as you may have gathered, the design work will be completed. The sole purpose behind all these sacrifices is this: the power companies must turn a profit from electricity generation. This decision will be made by the president, and Nizhny Novgorod Region will be obliged to fulfill whatever conditions RusHydro sets — at its own expense.

Background

Many thousands of residents of Mari El — especially from Kozmodemyansk, Gornomariysky District, and Yurinsky District — and of Nizhny Novgorod Region collected an enormous number of signatures and held meetings and rallies demanding that construction of the second phase of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station be halted, that the water level not be raised to mark 68, and that it be lowered by 3–4 metres instead.

In 1989, in Resolution No. 7/76/79 of 26 April 1989, the State Expert Commission of the USSR Gosplan, the State Expert Review Directorate of the USSR Gosstroy, and the Chief State Expert Review Office of the USSR State Committee for Nature Protection stated: "the normal pool level of the reservoir for the permanent operation of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station must be set at 63 m."

Economic benefits

Remezentsev: "The engineering flood-protection works will be built or completed at federal budget expense. Their maintenance will be at your budget's expense."

The peak spring output of the Cheboksary station will increase by 600 MW, and the average annual generation will grow by 1.24 billion kWh per year. The capacity factor will be only 28%.

For comparison: a single generating unit of a modern nuclear power plant with VVER (PWR) reactors produces more than 1 GW (1,000 MW), with average annual generation on the order of 8 billion kWh per year. Several such plants are often sited on the outskirts of large European, American, and Japanese cities. Moreover, unlike hydroelectric stations, nuclear power plants have no seasonal drop in electricity output.

According to a statement by the head of the Volga Investment Environmental Agency, Alexander Kosarikow, the construction of high dams on floodplain rivers has generally been discontinued throughout the civilized world: "In Europe, such things are not done, and for one simple reason: the environmental consequences of such actions are difficult to predict, and, accordingly, the economic losses are too."

Bringing the Cheboksary hydroelectric station to its design capacity would generate additional revenue of 100–130 billion rubles, but the costs would exceed 500 billion rubles.

Elimination of jobs

Along with the flooded fields and forests in the Mari El Republic, the corresponding jobs will disappear as well. However, as was established during public hearings, no creation of new jobs is planned.

Destruction of roads

The operation of the Bor pontoon bridge will be disrupted. The existing bridge ceases operation when water levels rise to marks considerably below 68 m. The rise in water levels will cause traffic jams tens of kilometers long during the morning and evening rush hours. Reopening the bridge at the new water level will require costly reconstruction of the moorings and an embankment 1.5 km long, and will only be possible after the reservoir has filled — a process that could take several years.

Studies conducted have shown that the effect of the reservoir's backwater in the Zarechka district will extend several kilometers into the city's territory, all the way to the indistinct watershed between the Oka and Volga rivers. This means that dry land that is currently in good condition will become waterlogged; basements, utility crawlspaces, and underground utility lines will be flooded; and areas that are currently damp will become swampy. To protect the Zarechka district, a network of drainage streams and canals will need to be created, along with a drainage system — that is, ring drainage will need to be laid along every street, road, and around every residential block, enterprise, and workshop. This is all complicated by the frequent lack of space within street cross-sections and the need to tear up the roads yet again.

Destruction of beaches

All city beaches will be flooded and will have to be created anew for a city of one and a half million people. But where? Will the water in the reservoir be suitable for swimming given the unaddressed discharges of untreated sewage from a number of enterprises and the near-total loss of water flow? It is clear that mass swimming in the reservoir cannot be avoided even under the strictest prohibitions.

Government decision

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ordered the adoption of the proposal of the Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, agreed upon with the relevant ministries and the government of Chuvashia, to prepare amendments in 2010 to the construction project for the Cheboksary hydroelectric station that would allow the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir to be raised to 68 m.

The decision to prepare the proposal was taken by Russian Federation Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref during a visit to the Republic of Chuvashia on November 24, 2005.

Impact on flora and fauna

As the reservoir fills, vast areas of forest will disappear, including the so-called steppified pine forests found along the left bank of the Volga and along the Vetluga and Kerzhenets rivers. Ancient floodplain oak groves, willow thickets, and black poplar stands will also vanish.

With the flooding and waterlogging of meadows, forests, and lakes, many valuable plants will perish: medicinal, edible, fodder, and ornamental species, including rare and relict species listed in the Red Book (Sempervivum stoloniferum, water chestnut, floating fern, dwarf naiad, and narrow-leaved feather grass). The impact of the reservoir will affect the surrounding forests located in the lowland areas, tens of kilometers from the shoreline, where the groundwater level will rise, leading to the following adverse consequences:

• waterlogging of forest land, primarily clearcuts, forest glades, hayfields, and similar areas;

• a significant portion of the territory with moist grass-type cover will transition to grass-bog, while bilberry stands will transition to sphagnum-moss types;

• forest plantations will perish from waterlogging, and hayfields will turn into low-lying bogs;

• in low-lying areas, groundwater will rise to the surface and remain there throughout the growing season, causing additional waterlogging and forest dieback, while in elevated areas it will approach the root zone and create unfavorable growth conditions — trees will become diseased and die off.

The flooding of natural plant communities will destroy the habitats of many animal species. Zoologists indicate that this will lead to the extinction of the floodplain black grouse and the floodplain desman, which inhabit the Volga floodplain in our region. The desman is an animal listed in the Red Data Book of the Nizhny Novgorod Region and on the IUCN Red List.

In Mari El, the planned flooding of forests across 31,000 hectares will result in the loss of productive forest land; the standing timber stock will be lost — half of the entire forest area will be destroyed. A significant expansion of the Cheboksary Reservoir's water surface, in addition to waterlogging, will also cause considerable desertification of upland areas, the preconditions for which are already observed on the sands of the Nizhny Novgorod Trans-Volga region and the Mari Lowland.

The concentration of enormous water masses across a broad plain will generate strong winds characteristic of sea coasts. In such conditions, deforested sandy shores will be eroded and large masses of sand, carried for dozens of kilometers, will bury any remaining vegetation. Under such conditions, both natural and artificial forest regeneration will be extremely difficult.

The treelessness of the area will accelerate wind erosion of light soils, and the process of landscape degradation will proceed as a chain reaction.

Fish Resources

The flooding of a significant number of floodplain sections of the Volga River and the weakening of its current will entail a restructuring of the local ichthyofauna. While triggering a population surge of such fish species as pike, bream, and roach during the first 3–4 years, the substantial inundation of the floodplain will ultimately lead to a deterioration of natural fish stock reproduction due to the mass destruction of spawning substrate. Raising the water level to the design mark will result in the destruction of the remaining natural spawning grounds and juvenile fish feeding areas.

The slowing of the current will sharply worsen the reproduction and habitat conditions for the most valuable fish species in the reservoir — the sterlet, which currently still maintains a fairly high population in the upper river section of the reservoir and in the Oka River. In time, this species may disappear from the reservoir entirely, as has already occurred in the Nizhny Novgorod Reservoir.

A reduction in water exchange in the reservoir will lead to a deterioration of the already unfavorable hydrochemical and sanitary condition of the water body, particularly in sections adjacent to such major industrial centers as Nizhny Novgorod, Dzerzhinsk, Kstovo, Balakhna, and Pravdinsk. The direct impact on fish stocks alone will manifest in fish kills from poisoning and the occurrence of oxygen-depletion events during the winter period. In a reservoir with stagnant conditions — which the Cheboksary Reservoir will become — an outbreak of ligulosis among cyprinid fish is inevitable. Oxygen-depletion events will intensify due to deteriorating water quality, both in winter and in summer in areas of intensive algal blooms in the reservoir. Small Rivers

The backwater effect will extend 83 km up the Oka, 90 km up the Sura River, and 123 km up the Vetluga River. In the backwater zones, silting processes will intensify and river current velocities will decrease. Above the backwater line, the riparian zone of many small rivers will become densely overgrown with aquatic and semi-aquatic vegetation.

On the one hand, the creation of the reservoir promotes a rise in groundwater levels and consequently increases the water content of small rivers. At the same time, however, the backwater effect intensifies bank erosion processes, destroys the mouth sections of rivers, and causes flooding of river floodplains.

In the backwater zone, a river ceases to be a river and, by all hydrological and hydrobiological indicators, transforms into a shallow bay of the reservoir. The fragile ecosystems of small rivers in the backwater zone are completely destroyed.

Impact on Water Quality

The Cheboksary Reservoir will be subjected to more intensive anthropogenic pressure than other Volga reservoirs. Its shores are home to many large cities and populated centers, including the major Nizhny Novgorod industrial hub. Under river conditions, wastewater is carried away by the current, gradually diluted and purified. Once the Cheboksary Reservoir is regulated to its design level, the water level will rise and the backwater effect will extend to the dam of the Nizhny Novgorod Hydroelectric Station. This will be the only reservoir on the Volga that will entirely lack a river section (normally the upper section of a reservoir, where high flow-through rates and riverine hydrochemical and hydrobiological conditions are preserved).

Under these conditions, current velocities in the area of the Nizhny Novgorod industrial hub may fall to 0.3 m/s (or lower). Any windy weather may give rise to wind-driven counter-currents. As a result, wastewater discharged into the water body may reach drinking water intake points. Water quality will also be affected by intensified bank erosion and silting of the reservoir bed. Silty sediments accumulate far greater quantities of various pollutants, including toxic substances, than sandy river sediments. Under any disturbance, they will become a source of additional secondary water contamination.

The territory of Dzerzhinsk will be partially flooded; prior to 1985, it hosted 19 plants of all-Union significance — classified defense enterprises. No geochemical map or geochemical assessment of waste for this territory exists — Evgeny Koposov, rector of NNGASU.

As the Cheboksary Reservoir fills to the 68 m mark, the area of shallow water zones will increase substantially; the high water temperature and significant organic matter content in these zones will promote mass growth of blue-green algae and other algal groups. This will lead to algal blooms in the summer, which is extremely detrimental to water quality. Blooms are already occurring in the Volga reservoirs (in particular in the Nizhny Novgorod Reservoir) and their harmful consequences are well known.

The full burden of the consequences of the water level rise will fall on Nizhny Novgorod Region and Mari El. For Chuvashia, this represents an insignificant flooded portion of its territory and minimal damage, whereas the Republic of Mari El will lose one third of its territory. Nizhny Novgorod Region will face rising groundwater and a host of unresolved problems — for instance, the issue of drinking water supply: a headwind will easily drive sewage from the Artemovsky meadows into the Oka water intakes.

Cultural heritage will be lost, and irreversible consequences for the environment and human health will follow.

The filling of the reservoir will cause great harm to the social infrastructure of the entire western half of Mari El. The settlement of Yurino and dozens of villages will be permanently cut off from Yoshkar-Ola and other economic centers.

Impact on Safety

On the territory of the Mari El Republic, in Kilyomarsky District, two anthrax burial sites will be flooded: one near the former village of Otary and one near the village of Senyushkino.[1] The risk of flooding of the burial site near the settlement of Lebedevsky by the Oshla and Malaya Kokshaga rivers will increase. Relocation of the burial sites is impossible.[2]

The sanitary condition of Nizhny Novgorod will deteriorate. Even now, sanitary authorities cannot rid residents of damp-basement buildings of biting insects. What will happen when this becomes widespread? Sporadic malaria cases, in the form of imported infections, have been recorded in Nizhny Novgorod Region over the past 11 years. The primary malaria vector — the Anopheles messeae mosquito — is found across virtually the entire territory of Nizhny Novgorod Region. In Nizhny Novgorod in 2009, the mid-season population density of malaria mosquitoes in daytime resting sites was 32 individuals per square metre. Extermination of adult mosquitoes is carried out upon registration of three-day malaria cases.

In recent years it has come to light that a powerful deep tectonic fault runs beneath the reservoir. This is evidenced by the discharge of deep-origin waters with elevated concentrations of mercury and other heavy metals, as well as radon. Raising the water level will increase the load on the reservoir bed, which may trigger intensification of seismic processes. [3]

In the event of a breach of the Gorodetsky hydraulic structures at the 63 m mark, the Zarechka part of Nizhny Novgorod would be flooded to a depth of 2 metres within just 2 hours. At a higher mark, flooding would occur more rapidly and reach a greater depth.

Opinions of Nizhny Novgorod Residents

Sociological surveys in Nizhny Novgorod Region show that 95–97 % of the population opposes raising the water level in the Cheboksary Reservoir. Consequently, the "sword of Damocles" of the "Cheboksary Flood" hanging perpetually over us provokes social tension in society and erodes trust in federal authorities. Civil organizations and residents have repeatedly initiated public mass events, signature drives in defence of their rights and interests, and protests against raising the water level in the Cheboksary Reservoir.

Nizhny Novgorod Region has been opposing the "Cheboksary Flood" for decades. In 1995 and 2006, the Regional Legislative Assembly of Nizhny Novgorod Region appealed to the President of Russia to prevent a rise in the water level of the Cheboksary Reservoir; in January 2012, a similar appeal was sent to the State Duma and the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; even earlier (in 1990–1992), the Nizhny Novgorod Regional Soviet of People's Deputies repeatedly issued similar appeals. Dozens of letters to the same effect were sent to federal authorities both by the current Governor V.P. Shantsev and by previous governors, and by the authorities of the Republic of Mari El.

In 1992, the position of the state authorities of Nizhny Novgorod Region and the Republic of Mari El was heard — by Russian Government Directive No. 468-r of 12.03.92, the current water level mark of the Cheboksary Reservoir was set at 63.0 m, and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of Russia was tasked, jointly with the Ministry of Finance of Russia and the regions, to complete all works necessary for operating the reservoir at the 63-metre mark within 4 years. Accordingly, the acts of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR aimed at preparing the reservoir zone for operation at the 68-metre mark — which JSC RusHydro cites — should have been recognized as having lost their force.

However, no one was held accountable for the failure to implement the decisions taken by the Russian Government. Moreover, the forces responsible for non-compliance with those decisions continue to push persistently for the Russian Government and President to take steps that are both highly inefficient and deeply unpopular with the public. As a result, work on preparing this project, which is dangerous to the region, continues. Given that the implementation of any project providing for a rise in the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir on the Volga River would entail large-scale negative environmental and socio-economic consequences across the Volga basin territories, a general sharp deterioration of the ecological situation, would require the resettlement of residents and significant expenditure on changes to the infrastructure and engineering protection of Nizhny Novgorod as a result of rising groundwater levels, any proposals to raise the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir are unacceptable to Nizhny Novgorod Region.

The conclusions of previous authoritative expert assessments — conducted repeatedly — are being completely ignored; diametrically opposite conclusions are being presented as truth, claiming alleged substantial economic efficiency of the project and its supposed supreme benefit to the ecology of the regions. Beyond bewilderment, this gives the public a sense that the project has a significant corruption component, which in the eyes of the population explains the heightened interest shown by the authorities in revising previously adopted state^[3] decisions. In the more than 20 years since the decision was made to set the reservoir level at 63 metres, nothing has occurred (other than an intensification of corruption) that would justify the persistence with which the project is being "pushed through^[3]." On the contrary, ever more new circumstances are emerging that point to the significant negative consequences of operating the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station even at the NWL-63 level.

The project initiated by JSC RusHydro to increase electricity generation by raising the water level in the Cheboksary Reservoir is ecologically harmful, economically inefficient, and impractical. The very idea of raising the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir must be rejected once and for all as inadmissible and entailing irreversible, catastrophic consequences for Nizhny Novgorod Region.

River Transport Workers

River transport workers on the problem of the Gorodetsky locks:

the problem here is a bit different — the Volga itself is fine; the most problematic stretch is the Gorodets–N. Novgorod section, where the currents are strongest, there are many shallows, and the bends are sharp. Across the entire Volga the guaranteed depth is 4 m, but on this stretch it is 3.5 m — and don't assume that's the actual depth either. So after years of dredging this section and removing sediment, they lowered the riverbed, and the water level dropped with it, while the lock sill at the lower pool naturally stayed where it was. As a result, vessels passing through the Gorky hydraulic structure sail underloaded — i.e., they operate at a loss. To solve this problem there was a project to build a low-head dam near Balakhna. I saw the concept sketch myself — it wasn't even a proper project, just a problem-solving scheme with calculations and no working drawings, and that was it! Meanwhile the Chuvash have wanted to raise the level since the days of the "Battle of Kulikovo." This whole business has been dragging on since Soviet times. Those who have traveled downstream may have noticed mooring walls standing far from the water's edge — a legacy of plans that actually had been drawn up long ago to raise the level, plans that were abandoned because of the potential ecological catastrophe. The Chuvash have their own interest — electricity, obviously. They couldn't care less about our water level; they'd happily bury it under roses. Right now the backwater of the Cheboksary reservoir starts just beyond the Kstovo bend, where the river begins to slow and gradually spread out. If the level is raised by three meters, it will be like the peak of a flood year — except that during a flood the current is strong, and here it will simply disappear. I hope that reason will prevail in the end.

Recollections of local residents about the previous water-level rise

I remember very well the time before the Cheboksary hydroelectric dam existed. You could drink water straight from the Volga opposite Makarevo. It never even crossed your mind to bring drinking water on an overnight fishing trip. You could walk calmly along the sandbars and watch the fish. I also remember when the flooding began. They ruined all the floodplain meadows, the river turned into one big dump, and the small rivers into small dumps. At that time I was living in Lyskovo. People from Makarevo were being resettled into Lyskovo's prefab five-story blocks. All the elderly were very quickly resettled into the cemetery. You have to understand the stress of people who had spent their entire lives in their own homes and ended up in freezing anthills in their old age. I remember footage from a documentary about the relocation of the cemetery in Makarevo. People were simply fainting. If they had raised the level to 68 metres straight away, we would not be seeing the Makaryev Monastery today, nor many streets in the towns along the Volga above Cheboksary, and probably not in Nizhny Novgorod either. I myself now live in a house whose basement floods every spring when the water rises, and sometimes in summer during heavy rains. Most likely my house won't survive a rise in the level. It will be hard to prove who is right here. We all need to rise up together against raising the level. Otherwise we'll end up living in Gadyukino, which will simply be washed away. Forgive me for being a bit muddled. It's just hard to imagine what will happen. pesterev007, NN.RU City Forum

The true role of dams

this is talking about navigation !!! Probably referring to a few private oil barges !!! as if nobody notices that the Volga is a solid brick of ice for 7 months of the year !!! Navigation lost all meaning long ago (the Stalinist kind — when steamboats hauled river sand up and down to meet the plan) !!! A hydroelectric dam on a flat river is like an F1 racing car with a Zaporozhets engine !!!! The only point of the GREAT Stalinist dams was to raise the water level (briefly — 5–7 hours) to float dry docks carrying submarines through ! That too seems to have died some 20 years ago !!!! Ten times over, the very idea of raising the water level — after a decision has been made to build a nuclear power plant — is sheer stupidity !!! NEIVANOV, NN.RU City Forum

Well, at last someone has remembered one of the main reasons the hydroelectric dam was built — raising the water level to transport submarines to the north. But that was genuinely relevant decades ago. vvn54, NN.RU City Forum

RusHydro Blog. 10 Myths about Raising the Cheboksary Reservoir Level

RusHydro Blog

"Emotional but poorly grounded talk of a 'dead sea' is not supported by the operational experience of other reservoirs — for example, the Gorky Reservoir, located in the same Nizhny Novgorod Region, whose shores are literally dotted with rest houses, sanatoriums, hunting lodges, and fishing camps."

"Relocating / local residents / is necessary in any case, even if the current reservoir level is maintained, since these people live in zones of existing waterlogging or flood inundation."

"The Zarechna part of Nizhny Novgorod sits at elevations of 69–80 m and therefore does not fall within the Cheboksary Reservoir's flood zone. At present, due to the absence of storm sewers and drainage systems, this part of the city experiences waterlogging (groundwater lying less than 3 m below the surface) that is historically established and entirely unrelated to the Cheboksary hydroelectric station, affecting roughly 33% of its area. Raising the reservoir to its design level could theoretically increase waterlogging by 26–40%, depending on the model used.

In practice, however, no waterlogging will occur, because raising the reservoir level requires the construction of a mandatory engineering protection system, one that will both eliminate existing waterlogging and prevent any waterlogging resulting from the reservoir's creation."

"In Nizhny Novgorod Region alone, around 600,000 hectares of arable land lie abandoned and are reverting to forest — http://www.apk-inform.com/showart.php?id=64013. Pastureland is even less needed — livestock grazing is far from flourishing in this country, and more than 70 million hectares of pasture in Russia go unused."

Roman: Well, what else could you expect from a blog belonging to RusHydro — that reservoirs are wonderful in every way!!! I live on the Volga, and the suffocating stench of the summer wind blowing off the river is enough to bring you to your senses. The green water of the Gorky Sea is hardly suitable for any sanitary purpose, the fish have taken on the habits of lake fish, and river navigation has vanished into thin air!!!

The Volga before the construction of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station dam

Living on the Volga, or on the shore of a dead sea?

As someone born, raised, and still living on the Volga — a fisherman, hunter, local historian, naturalist, and nature lover with an environmental education and experience working in the state forest protection service — I have had the opportunity to observe the changes taking place on the Volga River and the territories adjoining it from the 1960s to the present day, along the stretch from Nizhny Novgorod to the workers' settlement of Rabotki, Kstovsky District.

Before the Cheboksary hydroelectric station was commissioned, no major changes occurred. Everything followed its natural course. Mazut and other petroleum products would frequently drift down the river, as there was heavy river traffic and oil-loading wharves nearby — the selo of Veliky Vrag (the Kstovo Bend — one of the Volga's famous fishing spots). But on the whole the water was far cleaner than it is today. Above the river hung a scent unlike any other — meadow grasses and willow, mingled with the freshness of Volga river water. The sand along the left bank was white, clean, and crunchy, washed bright by the current.

There was fish in the Volga back then. Along the banks and from boats, people freely caught small fish — chekhonya (sabre carp) and bleak — using dip nets and scoop nets. The fishery inspectorate paid no attention to such catches until the 1980s.

With the rise of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station's water level in 1980, sweeping changes came to the landscape, flora, and fauna of the river itself and the territories closest to it.

At first the current in the Volga stopped abruptly, without any rise in water level. Large accumulations of silt were observed at the boundary where the current halted. Gradually that boundary crept upward — from the selo of Bezvodnoye — and moved above the town of Kstovo. The water became different, and dirty. Before 1980, people in Veliky Vrag still rinsed their laundry in the Volga. Once the water level rose, rinsing laundry there became impossible. In the 1970s, people used the Volga's soft water to wash their hair and cooked fish soup with it; nowadays you need to wash with soap after swimming in the Volga, and as for fish soup — there are no words.

The rise in water level had a profound effect on coastal plants, animals, and fish. The rich flora and fauna of the river changed dramatically: the composition of algae shifted, the banks became shallow and overgrown with pond scum, water lilies, and other aquatic plants; the diverse crustaceans and other plankton that had once teemed in the water nearly vanished. Fish stocks decline further with each passing year. The populations of sturgeon species — sterlet and sturgeon — fell sharply, as did those of pike-perch, asp, ide, ruffe, perch, white-eye bream, bleak, white bream, and roach. Bream appeared in greater numbers, along with large quantities of fish infected with tapeworm. The feeding grounds of many species of animals and birds were submerged: ducks (the gadwall and pintail), sandpipers, and moorhens disappeared from the areas where they had previously lived.

The banks began to slump. Streams and brooks flowing into the Volga became overgrown, shallowed out, and lost the force of their current. Springs that had once fed the ponds and rivers of the Volga floodplain were swallowed by water. The water table shifted abruptly, and new springs began emerging in different places, triggering widespread landslide processes across a vast territory. Floodplain lakes became waterlogged and choked with reed canary grass and other vegetation.

The water in the Volga became polluted and began to bloom prematurely: in late June to early July instead of August. The backwater lakes, which had previously been cleaned and flushed by spring floods, are now flushed less thoroughly or not at all.

The Volga's channel has been silting up and its deep holes filling in. The sand spit on the left bank of the Volga — stretching from the Kstovo bend to the village of Zimenki and serving as Kstovo's beach for one and a half kilometers — has ceased to exist. The spit was wide enough not only for volleyball but for football as well. It simply disappeared. Other spits along the banks vanished in the same way. The sand lost its cleanliness and turned yellow.

Certain hillocks, small islands, and rises that stood alongside water bodies and rivers near the Volga have sunk and spread. The water in the Volga and the nearby rivers and reservoirs now stands right at the foot of the bank — where one could once walk freely along the shore, one must now wade through water.

The annual ice crossing opposite the village of Veliky Vrag is no more: the ice melts through.

Raising the water level of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station will bring destruction on an even greater scale.

People live along the banks of the Volga; they have settled, cultivated, and tended their native land — it is their home, their homeland, passed down from generation to generation since time immemorial. These territories hold a great many things of value beyond counting, including historic sites and monuments that form the cultural heritage of our people. All of this could be submerged as a result of flooding.

The conclusion is plain: the one-off "deepening" of a river channel by raising the water level with a dam leads, in the long run, to even greater silting of the channel over an enormous stretch. And how are the many resulting problems to be solved? How is one subsequently to deepen the riverbeds — by raising the water level again? With dredges? How are reservoirs to be drained in order to restore the channel and ecological balance?

To deepen a river, one must increase the flow velocity. As the current speeds up, so does its scouring capacity. The water will do everything on its own, and for a long time to come. Remove the dams and the current will quicken. Another method is to narrow the river's width — but narrowing a dammed river is pointless because of the backwater effect. This approach is only viable in isolated cases on short stretches of river. Artificially narrowing the natural channel disrupts the ecology and the natural balance. Ice movement, the landscape, and the river's navigability for vessels will all deteriorate. Narrowing the channel will cause a sharp rise in floodwaters. Blocked groundwater will seek new outlets, altering the water table, triggering landslides, and causing waterlogging. Backwaters, inlets, fish spawning grounds, beaches, the flora and fauna of the shoreline and the land, and the feeding grounds of animals — including birds and aquatic creatures — will all disappear.

The senseless land-reclamation practice of draining marshes and waterlogged areas must be stopped. This natural balance, created by nature, regulates flooding, annual water reserves, and their proper expenditure.

On drained land — land channeled with ditches, with its ponds and marshes emptied — spring meltwater flows straight into the river without pause, without soaking into the soil, producing flooding followed by the shallowing of river basins and drought. Moreover, all the water rushes at once into the river across frozen ground without entering the soil at all.

In areas undisturbed by drainage, where marshes and other bodies of water remain, spring meltwater slowly fills the river basin and releases water gradually, sharply reducing the risk of flooding and high water. The water has time to percolate into the ground, replenishing the reserves of small springs.

Fish move into warm shallows, spawn, and have time to depart with their young before the water recedes. Fish spawn according to the season and weather conditions — specifically, water temperature. On drained land, fish enter the meadows to spawn, and when the water drops sharply before they have finished spawning, they are stranded in the meadows. Shed eggs hang on the grass without ever hatching into fry; the meadows smell of fresh fish and roe left lying on the ground. The dam floods the low floodplain zone — precisely the zone that contains the lakes and marshes serving as the natural regulator of water flow year-round. By alternately releasing and raising the water level, the dam constantly destroys fish populations, especially in spring during spawning.

Relevant to the matter at hand: land reclamation, by draining marshes and other wetlands, also leads to the disappearance of small springs, streams, and rivers. Drained areas become sources of fires that are extremely difficult to extinguish. The natural firebreaks that divide forested land into smaller, separate sections for fire-prevention purposes are eliminated. Instead of serving as firebreaks, marshes and other drained areas become potential fire hazards. After drainage, an area becomes more fire-prone both qualitatively (in terms of fire-hazard class) and quantitatively (as the fire-hazard area increases).

Land reclamation alters the climate: in drained areas it becomes sharply continental — intense heat, severe frost, abrupt temperature swings, and scarce precipitation.

In order to preserve and improve the ecological condition of the Volga and the territories adjoining it, it is now essential to prevent any rise in the water level of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station reservoir. Technologies should be developed and introduced to restore the natural flow and recharge of rivers, as well as technologies for making use of land freed from water when dams are lowered, in support of state economic development — wind turbines, water mills.

On the Vatoma, the Kudma, and other rivers flowing into the Volga, small mill dams used to stand in former times. The remains of some are still visible today. In Kstovsky District there is even a village called Zaprudnoye — "By the Mill Pond." I cannot say what effect those small dams had on the surrounding environment: I was not alive in that era. But if fish stocks are any guide, there were far more fish in those times, and that is an indisputable fact.

There are many existing developments for generating electricity and other forms of energy — nanotechnologies, energy-saving technologies — that need to be put into practice right now.

Wind power stations are commercially available; there are turbines that generate electricity from the natural current of a river, and much else besides, with no need to raise the water level at all. The right bank of the Volga is a highland of 100 to 200 metres; streams simply flow down its slopes and could be generating electricity.

A calculation must be made of how much harm — material and moral — the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station flooding causes and continues to cause each year. One must calculate how much electricity is generated, in monetary terms and at cost price, and weigh it against the losses — both material and moral — incurred each year. One must also calculate, and enter as losses, the profits that would have been earned each year from the territories, enterprises, factories, towns, and settlements going under the floodwaters.

The funds allocated to dealing with the consequences of flooding must be added to the losses: resettling people, building new settlements, constructing and repairing flood-protection structures, clearing flooded areas, felling timber, and so on.

One must calculate how much profit would be generated if the funds allocated to dealing with the consequences of flooding were instead directed toward the development of the territories, enterprises, factories, towns, and settlements currently going under the floodwaters, as well as toward developing other means of electricity generation — and calculate what profit this would yield each year.

It was established long ago that electricity generated by lowland rivers yields less profit than the land that is lost to flooding as a result.

The company RusHydro plans in the near future to hold public hearings on the possible raising of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station water level. I therefore wish to appeal to all those who are not indifferent to our natural environment and to our Volga — urging them to take part in these hearings without fail and to make their views known to the proponents of raising the water level. The voice of the people living on the banks of the Volga must be heard and taken into account.

Alexander Churazov, deputy of the Bezvodnensky rural council, Kstovsky District, Nizhny Novgorod Region

A Loan from Nature

Hydroelectric stations on lowland rivers have many drawbacks. In some countries, the restoration of fish stocks alone is sufficient grounds for decommissioning a hydroelectric station. Representatives of Nizhny Novgorod Region have repeatedly approached the project designers with the observation that an assessment of the costs of a possible return to the 63-metre mark is necessary. The designers have refused to carry out such an assessment time and again. And what is to be done if the costs of water treatment turn out to be several times greater than the revenue from selling electricity?

Song of the Rotting Volga

Long, long ago
The river
Volga
Has been rotting
Nearly rotted through
The Volga
Nobody cares
No ripe loaves of bread
No white snows
The Volga flows ownerless
Only there are no fish
For more than 17 years
Everyone dumps
Whatever they can
And over the water
Hangs a foul smog
When you come to knock back half a bottle
Don't even think
Of dipping your feet
In the Volga!
Long, long ago
The river
Volga
Has been rotting
Nearly rotted through
The Volga
Nobody cares
No ripe loaves of bread
No white snows
The Volga flows ownerless
Only there are no fish
The Volga rotted long ago
Must be thirty years by now
They sealed up the beautiful Volga
With a cascade of dams
By the decree
Of those political swine
Long, long ago
The Volga stands still
For seven decades now
The river Volga rots
And besides filth
There is nothing left in it….
Round up everyone
Who built the Cheboksary hydroelectric station
And give them seventeen years
On the bunk….

[4]

What the forests will look like after the Cheboksary Reservoir is raised

Photos: what the forests will look like after the Cheboksary Reservoir is raised: this was once a forest, another angle (photos by http://fotki.yandex.ru/users/segavi17)

In discussions among Nizhny Novgorod residents

• Dzerzhinsk City Forum. Ecology. The Cheboksary Flood in Dzerzhinsk — 2

See also

• Myths of the Cheboksary Reservoir

• Nizhny Novgorod Agglomeration

• Bor Floodplain

• Gorky (Nizhny Novgorod) Hydroelectric Station

• Volga River

• Gorky Sea

• Glob-Town

• Water Supply System in Nizhny Novgorod

• Grebnevskie Peski

Links

• Why Fish Die in Reservoirs and Why Boiler Plants Are Built near Hydroelectric Stations
  source lost

  The page no longer opens, and no copy exists in a web archive — neither we nor the author managed to save it in time. We are keeping the address where it used to be: the information in the article is based on it.

  http://clubs.ya.ru/4611686018427421160/replies.xml?item_no=2947&parent_id=2959

  clubs.ya.ru · checked 28 September 2026 · a copy exists — bring it

• Threats of the Cheboksary Reservoir (archive)

Sources

1. cron.nnov.org — Raising the Cheboksary Reservoir Level was delayed for years after United Russia members milked the issue for extensive self-promotion (archive)
2. V gorode N — Nizhny Novgorod residents given a reprieve from "the end of the world" (archive)
3. web.archive.org — Newspaper "Sarov" (Igor Makarov), excerpt from Yu. M. Kaganovich's report dated 04.07.1938; web.archive.org — "Motya-militsiya", 2008-08-12 (archive)

Sources

1. Ecocenter "Dront" — Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station (archive)
2. Ecocenter "Dront" — On the Problem of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station (archive)
3. Ecocenter "Dront" — On the Raising of the Cheboksary Reservoir Level to the Design Normal Pool Elevation of 68.0 m (archive)
4. nn.aif.ru — Argumenty i Fakty — Nizhny Novgorod — Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station: Rising on Tears (archive)
5. nn.aif.ru — Argumenty i Fakty — Nizhny Novgorod — Raising the Cheboksary Reservoir: What Will the Ecologists Say? (archive)
6. Vremya N — Cancellation of the Project to Raise the Water Level at the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station to Mark 68 (archive)
7. hydropower.ru — Hydropower of Russia — Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station (archive)
8. neftegaz.ru — Cheboksary Reservoir (archive)
9. MK — Nizhny Novgorod — MK in Nizhny Novgorod — The Question of the Balakhna Hydro Dam Remains Open (archive)
10. RIA Novosti — Construction Start of the Nizhny Novgorod Hydro Dam Postponed to 2021 (archive)
11. Kommersant (Volga Region) — A Dam Full of Doubts (archive)
12. MK — Nizhny Novgorod — MK in Nizhny Novgorod — Construction of the Dam near Balakhna Postponed (archive)
13. nn.aif.ru — Argumenty i Fakty — Nizhny Novgorod — Untangling the Dam. Is There a Future for the Low-Head Dam Project? (archive)
14. korabel.ru — Korabel.ru — Throughput Capacity of the Gorodets Hydro Dam to Reach 23.5 Million Tonnes in 2026 (archive)
15. korabel.ru — Korabel.ru — Gorodets Hydro Dam to Launch in Temporary Operation Mode in 2026 (archive)
16. portnews.ru — PortNews — Construction of Lock Chamber No. 15A to Be Completed in June 2026 (archive)
17. mintrans.gov.ru — Ministry of Transport of Russia — After Modernization, the Gorodets Hydro Dam Will Be Able to Handle up to 20 Million Tonnes of Cargo per Year (archive)