Myths of the Cheboksary Reservoir — a set of claims exchanged in the 2000s and 2010s by the parties to a dispute over whether to raise the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir from its operating mark of 63 metres to the design mark of 68. The dispute lasted more than thirty years, involved Nizhny Novgorod, Chuvashia, and Mari El, and was resolved in 2015–2018 in favour of keeping the 63-metre mark.[5][6] The navigation problem that had partly motivated the proposed rise was addressed by other means — reconstruction of the Gorodets Locks combined with channel dredging.[14]

The 63-metre mark

The reservoir was created in 1980 by damming the Volga at Novocheboksarsk and was filled in 1981 to the 63-metre mark rather than the design 68.[2] The Cheboksary Hydroelectric Power Plant was built from 1968 and commissioned in 1989; with an installed capacity of 1,370 megawatts it operates at no more than 60 per cent of design capacity, annual undergeneration amounts to approximately 1.4 billion kilowatt-hours, and the actual share of shallow-water areas in the reservoir is 31.5 per cent rather than the design figure of 20.7 per cent.[1]

The intermediate mark was not accidental. State expert assessment No. 7/76/79 of 26 April 1989 recommended "adopting a normal pool level of 63 m for the permanent operation of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station," and by a Russian Government directive of 12 March 1992, No. 468-r, the proposal for the 63.0-metre mark was accepted.[3]

The Nizhny Novgorod side returned to the question repeatedly: the regional Council spoke against a rise in April and November 1990, addressed the Supreme Soviet of Russia on 3 September 1992, and by Legislative Assembly resolution No. 85 of 21 June 1995 declared any rise above 63 metres inadmissible.[2]

The substance of the dispute

A new round began on 21 April 2010, when Russian Government directive No. 600-r set in motion the preparation of amendments to project documentation for the 68-metre mark.[4] The advocates of the rise — Chuvashia and the power industry — spoke of undergeneration of electricity, of navigation, and of the ecological condition of the shallow-water areas; for Chuvashia, the 68-metre mark was, in the words of Kommersant, a matter of principle.[6]

Nizhny Novgorod Region objected, citing the flooding and waterlogging of the low-lying Zarechka part of the city. According to calculations by the Dront ecocentre, headed by Kayumov Askhat Abdurakhmanovich, at the 68-metre mark an additional 89,900 hectares would go under water — 55,900 hectares of forest, 29,100 hectares of agricultural land, and 2,100 hectares of arable land; the total waterlogging area was estimated at 350,000 hectares, and the water level at Nizhny Novgorod would rise by four metres.[3][4] The Makaryevsky Monastery was also cited as being at risk.[6]

It was precisely around these estimates that the debate over "myths" was constructed: each side called the other side's arguments myths.

The arguments

Over thirty years of dispute a stable set of arguments took shape, repeated at hearings, round tables, and in the press with almost no variation. Those in favour of raising to the design mark insisted on the following:

  • the completion project had been prepared and had passed the necessary approvals;
  • the rise would complete a structure left unfinished since Soviet times, resolving the question of an abandoned construction site;
  • it would solve the navigation problem on the shallow stretch from Gorodets to Nizhny Novgorod;
  • it would improve conditions in the Volga–Akhtuba floodplain downstream;
  • electricity generation and the station's profitability would increase;
  • the area of shallow-water zones — and with it, algal blooms — would decrease;
  • fish stocks would grow at the 68-metre mark;
  • no alternatives to the design mark existed and compromise was impossible.

The Nizhny Novgorod side's objections

Opponents of the rise replied with an equally stable set of counter-arguments:

  • at 63 metres the reservoir does not encroach on the Nizhny Novgorod agglomeration, whereas at 68 it would flood the low-lying Zarechka part of the city;
  • the rise would cause bank collapses and reactivate landslides on the Oka slopes;
  • anthrax livestock burial grounds would fall within the flood zone;
  • the relocation of gas pipelines and other engineering infrastructure was not fully accounted for in the cost estimates;
  • intermediate marks between 63 and 68 metres had not been seriously considered;
  • the stated cost of the rise was understated and the damage had not been fully calculated.

The 2015 decision

In June 2014 the President instructed the government to prepare proposals on the choice of level. On 15 January 2015 the Ministry of Economic Development reported that it considered it expedient to maintain the normal pool level at 63 metres; on 28 May the government forwarded this proposal to the President, and in July it was instructed to develop a plan for completing the construction of the hydroelectric station at the existing water level.[5]

In this way the main argument of the rise's advocates — that completion must necessarily proceed to the design mark — ceased to define state policy.

The 2018 meeting

On 1 October 2018, at a meeting chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, the Nizhny Novgorod Region's position was endorsed: raising the pool level of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station to 68 metres was declared inexpedient.[6]

At the same meeting figures were presented that overturned the economic argument of the rise's advocates: the cost of raising the level was estimated at 136 billion roubles, while the cost of maintaining the current state was put at 238.3 billion. At the 63-metre mark the station operates at 60 per cent of its installed capacity of 1,404 megawatts, and the share of shallow-water areas stands at 31.5 per cent.[6]

The low-head hydraulic structure

In place of the rise, regional and federal authorities turned to the Nizhny Novgorod low-head hydraulic structure — a dam below Gorodets that would raise the water level only on the problematic stretch. The cost of the project was estimated at 43.5 billion roubles, while environmentalists calculated 330 billion roubles in potential damage from the construction.[7]

In the summer of 2020 the Region proposed abandoning the dam in favour of a third lock lane at Gorodets and dredging of the forty-kilometre stretch; construction of the locks was estimated at 7.5 billion roubles, while the cost of dredging had not been calculated. The Volga Basin Administration responded at the time that the alternative was not under discussion and that no pre-project work on it existed.[8]

The dam, however, failed to pass expert review. Glavgosekspertiza issued a negative assessment of the project documentation, and in December 2020 the Volga Basin Administration terminated the contract with the designer; both the Region and environmentalists had opposed the dam, fearing waterlogging of Balakhna.[9]

Locks instead of a rise

The third option prevailed. The scope of work included construction of lock No. 15a, reconstruction of locks No. 15 and No. 16 and of a protective embankment, and dredging of the Volga's shallow stretches; the contract value rose from 21.7 to 31.8 billion roubles, and the completion date was pushed back from 2024 first to 2025 and 2026, then to 2027.[13]

From 22 to 25 July 2025 passage through the hydraulic structure was restricted: the contractor had not fully dismantled the dividing wall between the locks, erosion of the foundations led to a collapse, sections of the wall fell into the navigation channel and flooded the lock chambers. The Audit Chamber estimated the losses of shipping companies at approximately 123 million roubles.[10]

In January 2026 the Minister of Transport reported that the launch in temporary-operation mode was planned for 2026 and the completion of the lock reconstruction for 2027; the project cost had risen to 32 billion roubles, and cargo throughput on the stretch was to grow from four to 25 million tonnes per year.[12] By March 2026 more than 400 workers and 45 pieces of equipment were on site, vessels were passing through chamber No. 16, and work was proceeding under the national project "Efficient Transport System".[11]

On 23 April 2026 the first vessels of the navigation season passed through lock No. 14 — the cruise vessel Konstantin Simonov and the pusher tug Ivan Shchepetov. Dredging provides a guaranteed navigable depth of four metres over a forty-kilometre stretch, and throughput capacity after full commissioning will increase more than fivefold — from 3.6 to 20 million tonnes of cargo per year.[14]

Sources

  1. hydropower.ru — Hydropower of Russia — Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station — station and reservoir specifications (archive)
  2. Ecocentre Dront — Ecological Centre Dront — Cheboksary Reservoir: a chronicle of level decisions
  3. Ecocentre Dront — Ecological Centre Dront — On the project to raise the Cheboksary Reservoir level to 68 metres (archive)
  4. Ecocentre Dront — Ecological Centre Dront — On raising the Cheboksary Reservoir level to the design normal pool level of 68.0 m (archive)
  5. Ecocentre Dront — Ecological Centre Dront — Cheboksary Reservoir: the decision to maintain the 63-metre mark (archive)
  6. Kommersant (Volga Region) — Raising the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station level to 68 metres declared inexpedient (archive)
  7. Kommersant (Volga Region) — Nizhny Novgorod low-head hydraulic structure: cost and damage estimates (archive)
  8. Kommersant (Volga Region) — Region proposes third lock lane instead of dam (archive)
  9. Kommersant (Volga Region) — Low-head hydraulic structure project receives negative expert assessment (archive)
  10. portnews.ru — Audit Chamber estimates shipping companies' losses from accident at Gorodets hydraulic structure
  11. portnews.ru — Progress of works at Gorodets hydraulic structure in spring 2026
  12. nn.rbc.ru — RBC — Nizhny Novgorod — Minister of Transport on the timeline and cost of the Gorodets hydraulic structure reconstruction (archive)
  13. GIPERNN — Temporary-operation mode to be introduced at Gorodets hydraulic structure in 2026 (archive)
  14. mintrans.gov.ru — Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation — After modernisation, the Gorodets hydraulic structure will be able to handle up to 20 million tonnes of cargo per year