Myths of the Cheboksary Reservoir — a set of claims exchanged in the 2000s and 2010s by the parties to the dispute over whether to raise the level of the Cheboksary Reservoir from its operating mark of 63 metres to the design level of 68. The dispute lasted more than thirty years, involved Nizhny Novgorod, Chuvashia, and Mari El, and was resolved in 2015–2018 in favour of retaining the 63-metre mark.[1][2] The navigation problem that had partly motivated the proposed rise was addressed by other means — the reconstruction of the Gorodets hydraulic complex combined with channel dredging.[3]

The 63-metre mark

The reservoir was created in 1980 by damming the Volga near Novocheboksarsk and was filled in 1981 to the 63-metre mark instead of the design level of 68.[4] The Cheboksary Hydroelectric Power Station was under construction from 1968 and was commissioned in 1989; with an installed capacity of 1,370 megawatts, it operates at no more than 60 percent of its design capacity, the annual shortfall in generation is around 1.4 billion kilowatt-hours, and the actual proportion of shallow waters in the reservoir is 31.5 percent rather than the design figure of 20.7 percent.[5]

The intermediate mark was no accident. The conclusion of state expert review No. 7/76/79, dated 26 April 1989, recommended "adopting a normal pool level of 63 m for the permanent operation of the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Power Station," and by a directive of the Government of Russia dated 12 March 1992, No. 468-r, the proposal for the 63.0-metre mark was adopted.[6]

The Nizhny Novgorod side returned to the question repeatedly: the Regional Council came out against the rise in April and November 1990, on 3 September 1992 appealed to the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and by Resolution No. 85 of the Legislative Assembly dated 21 June 1995, raising the level above 63 metres was declared inadmissible.[4]

What the dispute was about

A new round began on 21 April 2010, when Government of Russia Directive No. 600-r set in motion the preparation of amendments to the project documentation for the 68-metre mark.[7] Supporters of the rise — Chuvashia and the energy sector — spoke of undergeneration of electricity, of navigation, and of the ecological condition of the shallow-water areas; for Chuvashia, the 68-metre mark was, in the words of Kommersant, a matter of principle.[2]

Nizhny Novgorod Region objected, citing the flooding and waterlogging of the low-lying Zarechka area. According to calculations by Ecocentre "Dront" (listed in the register of NGOs classified as foreign agents from 22 May 2015 to 31 August 2017), headed by Askhat Kayumov, at the 68-metre mark an additional 89,900 hectares would be submerged — 55,900 hectares of forest, 29,100 hectares of agricultural land, and 2,100 hectares of arable land; the total area of waterlogging was estimated at 350,000 hectares, and the water level at Nizhny Novgorod would rise by four metres.[6][7] Makaryev Monastery was also named among the areas at risk.[2]

It was precisely around these assessments that the dispute over "myths" was constructed: each side called the other's arguments myths.

The set of arguments

Over thirty years of dispute, a stable set of arguments took shape, repeated at hearings, round tables, and in the press with almost no variation. Supporters of raising the level to the design mark insisted on the following:

  • the completion project has been prepared and has passed the necessary approvals;
  • the rise completes a structure left unfinished since Soviet times, and resolves the question of an abandoned construction project;
  • the problem of navigation on the shallow stretch from Gorodets to Nizhny Novgorod is resolved;
  • the condition of the Volga-Akhtuba floodplain downstream is improved;
  • electricity generation and the station's profitability increase;
  • the area of shallow-water zones is reduced, and with it the blooming of water;
  • fish stocks will increase at the 68-metre mark;
  • no alternatives to the design mark exist, and compromise is impossible.

Objections from the Nizhny Novgorod side

Opponents of the rise responded with an equally stable set of objections:

  • at the 63-meter mark the reservoir does not back up into the Nizhny Novgorod Agglomeration, whereas at 68 meters it would flood the low-lying Zarechka part of the city;
  • the rise would cause bank collapses and reactivate landslides on the Oka slopes;
  • anthrax cattle burial sites fall within the flood zone;
  • the relocation of gas transmission networks and other engineering infrastructure is not fully accounted for in the cost estimate;
  • intermediate water levels between 63 and 68 meters were never seriously considered;
  • the stated cost of the rise is understated, and the damage has not been fully calculated.

The 2015 Decision

In June 2014 the president instructed the government to prepare proposals on the choice of water level. On 15 January 2015 the Ministry of Economic Development reported that it considered it advisable to maintain the normal impoundment level at 63 meters; on 28 May the government forwarded this proposal to the president, and in July an order was issued to develop a plan for completing the hydroelectric station's construction at the existing water level.[1]

In this way, the main argument of those who favored raising the level — that construction must be completed to the design elevation — ceased to drive government policy.

The 2018 Meeting

On 1 October 2018, at a meeting chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, the position of Nizhny Novgorod Region was upheld: raising the impoundment level of the Cheboksary hydroelectric station to 68 meters was deemed inadvisable.[2]

At the same meeting, calculations were presented that overturned the economic argument of those favoring the rise: the cost of raising the level was estimated at 136 billion rubles, while maintaining the current state would cost 238.3 billion rubles. At the 63-meter mark, the station operates at 60 percent of its installed capacity of 1,404 megawatts, and the share of shallow-water areas is 31.5 percent.[2]

The Low-Head Hydraulic Structure

As an alternative to raising the level, regional and federal authorities took up the Nizhny Novgorod low-head hydraulic structure — a dam below Gorodets that would raise the water level only on the problematic stretch. The project's cost was estimated at 43.5 billion rubles, while environmentalists calculated 330 billion rubles in potential damage from construction.[8]

In the summer of 2020 the Region proposed abandoning the dam in favor of a third lock lane at Gorodets and dredging of a forty-kilometer section; lock construction was estimated at 7.5 billion rubles, while the cost of dredging had not been calculated. The Volga Basin Administration responded at the time that the alternative option was not under discussion and that no pre-project work had been done on it.[9]

The dam, however, failed the expert review. Glavgosexpertiza issued a negative finding on the project documentation, and in December 2020 the Volga Basin Administration terminated the contract with the designer; both the Region and environmentalists — who feared flooding of Balakhna — had opposed the dam.[10]

A Lock Instead of a Rise

That very third option survived. The scope of work included construction of lock No. 15a, reconstruction of locks No. 15 and No. 16 and a protective embankment, as well as dredging of shallow sections of the Volga; the contract value grew from 21.7 to 31.8 billion rubles, and the completion date was pushed back from 2024, first to 2025–2026 and then to 2027.[11]

From July 22 to 25, 2025, traffic through the hydraulic structure was restricted: the contractor had not fully dismantled the dividing wall between the locks, erosion of the foundations led to a collapse, sections of the wall fell onto the shipping channel and flooded the lock chambers. The Audit Chamber estimated the losses of shipping companies at approximately 123 million rubles.[12]

In January 2026, the Minister of Transport announced that the launch in temporary-operation mode was planned for 2026, with the completion of the lock reconstruction scheduled for 2027; the cost of the project had risen to 32 billion rubles, and the freight turnover of the section was expected to grow from four to 25 million tonnes per year.[13] By March 2026, more than 400 workers and 45 units of machinery were operating on site, vessels were passing through chamber No. 16, and the work was being carried out under the national project "Efficient Transport System".[14]

On April 23, 2026, the first vessels of the navigation season passed through lock No. 14 — the cruise ship Konstantin Simonov and the pusher tug Ivan Shchepetov. Dredging provides a guaranteed navigable depth of four metres along a forty-kilometre stretch, and the throughput capacity after full commissioning will increase more than fivefold — from 3.6 to 20 million tonnes of cargo per year.[3]

Sources

  1. Ecocenter "Dront" — Ecological Center "Dront" — Cheboksary Reservoir: decision to maintain the 63-meter mark (archive)
  2. Kommersant (Volga Region) — Raising the Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station level to 68 meters deemed inadvisable (archive)
  3. mintrans.gov.ru — Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation — After modernization, the Gorodetsky hydraulic complex will be able to handle up to 20 million tons of cargo per year (archive)
  4. Ecocenter "Dront" — Ecological Center "Dront" — Cheboksary Reservoir: a chronicle of decisions on the water level
  5. hydropower.ru — Hydropower of Russia — Cheboksary Hydroelectric Station — station and reservoir specifications (archive)
  6. Ecocenter "Dront" — Ecological Center "Dront" — On the project to raise the Cheboksary Reservoir level to 68 meters (archive)
  7. Ecocenter "Dront" — Ecological Center "Dront" — On raising the Cheboksary Reservoir to the design normal pool elevation of 68.0 m (archive)
  8. Kommersant (Volga Region) — The Nizhny Novgorod low-head hydraulic complex: cost and damage assessments (archive)
  9. Kommersant (Volga Region) — The Region proposed a third set of lock chambers instead of a dam (archive)
  10. Kommersant (Volga Region) — The low-head hydraulic complex project received a negative expert review conclusion (archive)
  11. GIPERNN — A temporary operating regime will be introduced at the Gorodetsky hydraulic complex in 2026 (archive)
  12. portnews.ru — The Accounts Chamber assessed losses of shipping companies from the accident at the Gorodetsky hydraulic complex (archive)
  13. nn.rbc.ru — RBC — Nizhny Novgorod — Transport Minister on the timeline and cost of reconstruction of the Gorodetsky hydraulic complex (archive)
  14. portnews.ru — Progress of works at the Gorodetsky hydraulic complex in spring 2026 (archive)